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Abstract: This paper discusses Gadamer’s 
interpretation of Cusanus’ concept of ver-
bum focusing on three metaphysical prob-
lems: pantheism, the spirit as image of God, 
Being as the word. First, the understanding 
of God as creative word offers the right bal-
ance between transcendence and presence 
within creation. Second, the verbum envi-
sions a subjectivity that mirrors the sponta-
neity and creativity of the divine word. Third, 
the concept of Being is wired with a theory 
of creation rooted in the divine dynamic in-
teriority, which manifests itself in the emer-
gence of the verbum.
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Resumen: Este artículo discute la interpre-
tación gadameriana del concepto cusano de 
verbum, en relación con tres problemas me-
tafísicos: panteísmo, el espíritu como ima-
gen de Dios, el Ser como palabra. Primero, 
la comprensión de Dios como palabra crea-
dora ofrece el equilibrio correcto entre tras-
cendencia y presencia en la creación. Se-
gundo, el verbum concibe una subjetividad 
que refl eja la espontaneidad y creatividad de 
la palabra divina. Tercero, el concepto de Ser 
está conectado con una teoría de la crea-
ción arraigada en la interioridad dinámica 
divina, que se manifi esta a sí misma en la 
emergencia del verbum.
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T he philosophy of the 20
th century was dominated by the so 
called linguistic turn. This turn is not, though, entirely new. 
The high importance of language had been stressed already 
in medieval philosophy and theology, which transposed the Greek 
logos into the tradition of the verbum that refl ected the Christian rev-
elation. How does philosophy change if we conceive it as being con-
centrated in the fi gure of language? I will try to answer this question 
from the perspective of Gadamer’s reading of the medieval tradi-
tion. Gadamer believes that the medieval verbum is well equipped 
to face some crucial challenges of metaphysics: the relation between 
God and the created world, the question of Being, the question 
of the human mind. Medieval thinkers like Augustine, Aquinas or 
Cusanus have built up a conception of language that is intimately 
linked with such questions. In this paper I will restrict my analysis to 
Gadamer’s reading of Cusanus, because his writings on the cardinal 
from Cues explicitly connect the challenges of metaphysics with the 
issue of the divine and human language. 
Why should language become the eminent way into metaphys-
ics? Gadamer refers in his text Nicolaus Cusanus and the Present1 to 
three points: the problem of pantheism, the spirit as image of God, 
and Being as the word. I will show how these points connect to a more 
general evaluation of the possibility of metaphysics from the perspec-
tive of hermeneutics, as laid down by Gadamer in the aftermath of his 
teacher Heidegger. The hermeneutics of verbum is not focused on the 
immanent analysis of propositions in terms of logical and grammati-
cal structures, but it rather captures verbum as the underlying princi-
ple of world creation and world order, and, at the human level, as the 
vessel of Being. Second, the hermeneutics of verbum inserts language 
into the relation between man and God and elaborates an existential 
view of man understood as creative being. The hermeneutic linguistic 
turn has thus a theological-metaphysical nature as well as an existen-
tial import inspired by the medieval verbum. 
1. H.G. GADAMER, Nicolaus Cusanus and the Present, transl. Ted George, “Epoché” 
7/1 (2002) 71-79.
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Cusanus, Gadamer shows, is a late discovery of our histori-
cal consciousness. The German Romantics’ return to tradition did 
not consider Cusanus; it was only in the 19th century that Cusanus 
was fi rst studied by Neokantians. The interest of Neokantians was 
moved mainly by epistemology and natural sciences. They saw in 
Cusanus a thinker whose philosophical and theological insights had 
paved the way to modern philosophy (namely to Kant) and to mod-
ern science. This type of interest is nonetheless different from the 
speculative interest that our century has in Cusanus. In 1940, Ernst 
Hoffmann saw in Cusanus no longer the predecessor of Kant, but 
the speculative thinker that infl uenced the German idealism and 
the quasi pantheistic worldview of Goethe. The Heidelberg critical 
edition of Cusanus’s complete works brought into light the inter-
dependence of philosophy and theology in his thoughts. The Cu-
sanian epistemology must therefore be approached not only from 
the methodological perspective of modern sciences (as Neokantians 
have done), but also from the point of view of the theological knowl-
edge of God. The actuality of Cusanus lies not only in the relevance 
of his thought for modern science, but also in his ability to hold 
together philosophical and theological issues in a new way2.
 Starting from this speculative infl uence, hermeneutics should 
seek in Cusanus answers to some questions of the contemporary 
metaphysics. Heidegger’s groundbreaking critique of the classic 
metaphysics (defi ned as onto-theology) calls for a new evaluation of 
the possibility of metaphysics as such. It is indeed the heated debate 
on the overcoming of metaphysics that could prompt a reevalua-
tion of the past and rediscovery of forgotten authors: “However, 
the voices of the past always become truly perceptible fi rst when 
questions from the present are directed toward them”3.
Heidegger’s critique of the philosophical tradition targets a 
basic type of reductionism in the understanding of Being, the most 
important philosophical question. Philosophy has from its very be-
2. H.G. GADAMER, Epilog, in R. HAUBST (ed.), Nikolaus von Kues in der Geschichte des 
Erkenntnisproblems (Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, Mainz, 1975) 277. 
3. H.G. GADAMER, Nicolaus Cusanus cit., 71.
MIRELA OLIVA
404 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 49/2 (2016) 401-422
ginning asked the question of Being: what it means that something 
is, what is the is-ness of things. In this question lies already a danger, 
namely the possibility to confound the is-ness of entities with an 
entity. The major error that philosophy made, although it started 
by asking the right question, was precisely the identifi cation of the 
Being of entities, their is-ness so to speak, with an entity present-at-
hand, something that lies down in front of our eyes. This error can 
be already found in certain elements of Plato and Aristotle, then in 
the Scholastic metaphysics. In this scenario of the present-at-hand, 
God is an entity that produced the world as an external cause, a sort 
of mechanic producer. Heidegger sees in this god of onto-theology 
a god that cannot be approached with the religious fervour: man 
can neither pray nor sacrifi ce to this god4. German idealism, al-
though different from the Greek and Scholastic metaphysics, is just 
the subjectivist reversal of this idea of present-at-hand, so that the 
transcendental subject is nothing else than an instance that organ-
izes and arranges entities present-at-hand.
 Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics was internalized by Gad-
amer with moderation. His respectful attitude toward tradition ena-
bled him, indeed, to look for resources in the tradition that can solve 
such diffi culties and allow hermeneutics to reshape philosophy on a 
new basis. In the following we will see how the three metaphysical 
issues that Gadamer identifi es in Cusanus (pantheism, imago Dei, 
Word as Being) can offer a way to do metaphysics from the stand-
point of a hermeneutic retrieval of the verbum.
1. THE PROBLEM OF PANTHEISM
The problem of pantheism has to do with God’s presence in the 
world. It addresses the theistic diffi culty to emphasize a creator who 
stands above His creatures but is, at the same time, present into His 
own creation. Pantheism has pushed the presence of God to an ex-
treme: everything created is part of God, and God is in everything 
4. M. HEIDEGGER, Identity and Difference, transl. & intr. Joan Stambaugh (University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1974) 72.
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created. The universe and God are therefore identical in substance, 
a theory condemned by the fi rst Vatican Council. The major rep-
resentative of this type of thinking was Spinoza, although the term 
itself was coined later on, in the eighteenth century. The extreme 
position of pantheism turns against the Christian theological claim 
of the difference between God and His creation. While Cusanus 
was never ecclesiastically “charged” with the accusation of panthe-
ism, his philosophy brings into play some elements close to panthe-
ism. The theologian Johannes Wenck, his contemporary, attacked 
Cusanus’ De docta ignorantia on the basis of this supposedly latent 
pantheism, which Cusanus might have shared with Meister Eckhart. 
Cusanus responded to Wenck’s critical text De ignota literatura with 
a new text, Apologia doctae ignorantiae, in which he also defended 
Meister Eckhart’s positions. 
Whether Cusanus was a pantheist or not makes the object of 
many studies, among which Gadamer cites Ernst Hoffmann. On 
the one hand, Cusanus defends some expressions that could be sus-
pected of pantheism (for instance omnia in omnibus); on the other 
hand, he maintains the distinction between creator and created. As 
Louis Dupré shows in his study The Question of Pantheism from Eck-
hart to Cusanus5, Cusanus maintains that God is omne quod est (all 
that is), but also pays attention to terminological accuracy, especially 
in regards to the use of Thomistic terms. Such use was indeed mis-
leading in Eckhart, who brought it into confusion by identifying esse 
with essence. In naming God the non aliud (the not-other), Cusanus 
defi nes Him as essentia essentiarum (the essence of essences) or the 
quidditas of all things, or forma formarum (the form of all forms) 
or, alternatively, forma omnium (borrowed from John Scottus Eriu-
gena). God is present as such in all creatures: “in all things God is 
all things even though He is none of these things”6. 
5. L. DUPRÉ, The Question of Pantheism from Eckhart to Cusanus, in P. CASARELLA 
(ed.), Cusanus: The Legacy of Learned Ignorance (CUA Press, Washington, 2006) 
74-88.
6. CUSANUS, De li non aliud, in J. HOPKINS, Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not-Other: 
A Translation and an Appraisal of ‘De li non aliud’ (Banning Press, Minneapolis, 
1983) 50-51. See also W. BEIERWALTES, Cusanus und Proklos. Zum neuplatonischen 
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The distance of this exemplarism from pantheism can be 
demonstrated, according to Louis Dupré, by two elements: the 
likeness and the image. These elements indicate God’s relation 
with sensible things (likeness), respectively with the human being 
(image):
Likeness refers to the general presence of God in everything. 
But only in a spiritual being is that likeness an image of God. 
Though God’s presence is always total, the mode of that pres-
ence varies according to the degree of participation. Intellec-
tual beings participate at a higher degree in God’s life, and 
they may increase their capacity of participation as they be-
come more and more aware of their being images of God. This 
increase results from the mind’s intellectual endeavors but also, 
and above all, from the infusion of divine grace. Yet no degree 
of participation reaches absolute unity between the mind and 
God. Cusanus maintains an insurmountable distinction be-
tween God and the created mind, and this places his position 
beyond any suspicion of pantheism7.
Cusanus’ platonism is thus the main factor that ‘saves’ him from 
pantheism. His strong emphasis on the presence of God in the cre-
ated things and in the human spirit has nonetheless nurtured the 
tendency of pantheism of German Idealism in its confrontation with 
the Christian heritage. The speculative idealism has directed the 
Cusanian idea of the world as unfolding from God’s spirit towards a 
radical idealist position that identifi es the essence of being with the 
spontaneity of the spirit.
However, the pantheism-debate regarding Cusanus is not rel-
evant only for an evaluation, from a historical view point, of the 
pantheist tendency in German philosophy. Rather, the discussion 
Ursprung des ‘non aliud’, in Nicolò Cusano agli inizi del mondo moderno (Atti del 
Congresso internazionale in occasione del V centenario della morte di Nicolò 
Cusano, Bressanone, 6-10 settembre 1964) (Sansoni, Florence, 1970) 137-140; 
E.A. WYLLER, Zum Begriff ‘non aliud’ bei Cusanus, in Nicolò Cusano cit., 419-443.
7. L. DUPRÉ, op.cit., 86.
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about pantheism shows the continuous need of philosophy to fi nd 
an approach to God’s relation to the world that is not limited to the 
automatic scheme producer/created. The relevance of this debate 
for contemporary metaphysics is easy to observe. The detached, 
mechanic divine producer that is depicted in Heidegger’s critique 
of onto-theology must be challenged by a fi gure of the divine that 
infuses the creation with its power and plenitude. The question at 
stake is the relation between God, on the one hand, and created 
things, on the other hand. This relation receives an optimal explana-
tion in Cusanus by means of the concept of verbum, the Latin trans-
lation of the Greek logos. The understanding of God as creative ver-
bum could help us overcome the temptation of pantheism through 
the right balance between transcendence and presence within crea-
tion. The divine word smooths the transcendence of God; it is a 
manifestation of divine plenitude that culminates in the Incarnation 
of God in a human being, Jesus Christ. 
Gadamer reads thus Cusanus’ conception of the verbum 
as a possible answer to the problem of pantheism. This answer 
has important consequences on the understanding of the human 
spirit and on the understanding of the being of the created in 
general. We see therefore how the problem of pantheism opens 
up, through the metaphysics of language, a new anthropology and 
a new ontology; I will explore these features in the following two 
paragraphs.
2. THE SPIRIT AS IMAGE OF GOD
The focus on the divine word (verbum) is a new feature of Chris-
tianity, although verbum is of course nothing else than the Latin 
translation of the Greek logos. Cusanus was aware of this novelty in 
regards to the ancient Greek metaphysics that did not fully capture 
the life and dynamics of a divine word that is more than absolute 
necessity:
Indeed, the philosophers were not adequately instructed re-
garding the Divine Word and absolute Maximum. And so, they 
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envisioned mind and soul and necessity as present uncontract-
edly in a certain unfolding of Absolute Necessity8.
Cusanus tries to solve the diffi culties of the Platonic theory of 
Forms through the pair of concepts complicatio/explicatio. Complicatio 
is the enfolding of the world in God’s mind; the enfolded multiplic-
ity is then unfolded, contracted (explicatio) in a diversity of created 
beings9. The relation between complicatio and explicatio can be ex-
plained through the analogy with the relation between the point and 
the line: the point is the enfolding of the line (it contains in itself the 
possibility of the line), while the line is the unfolding of the point. 
In contrast with the pluralistic realm of platonic forms, the 
complicatio indicates one absolute form of forms, the Word of God:
Hence, the forms of things are not distinct except as they exist 
contractedly; as they exist absolutely they are one, indistinct 
[Form], which is the Word in God (...) For only one infi nite 
Exemplar is suffi cient and necessary; in it all things exist, as the 
ordered exists in the order. [This exemplar] very congruently 
enfolds all the essences of things, regardless of how different 
they are, so that Infi nite Essence is the most true Essence of 
the circle and is not greater or lesser or different or other [than 
the circle] (...) Forms do not have actual existence except (1) in 
the Word as Word and (2) contractedly in things10.
The divine Word is therefore that through which God creates the 
world. God is present within His creation through His Word, God 
the Son, incarnated in Jesus. The procession of the Word (God 
the Son) from God’s mind (God the Father) and the Incarnation of 
8. CUSANUS, De docta ignorantia, in Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of 
Nicholas of Cusa, transl. J. Hopkins (Banning Press, Minneapolis, 2001) 86. On 
Cusanus‘ philosophy of language see: K.O. APEL, Die Idee der Sprache bei Nicolaus 
von Cues, in “Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte” 1 (1955) 200-221; J. B. ELPERT, Loqui 
est revelare – Verbum ostensio mentis: Die sprachphilosophische Jagdzüge des Nikolaus 
Cusanus (Lang, Frankfurt/M, 2002).
9. CUSANUS, De docta cit., II, Ch. 3.
10. CUSANUS, De docta cit., 85-86.
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Jesus Christ are fundamental aspects of the tradition of the verbum. 
These aspects have for Gadamer a decisive metaphysical impor-
tance, in so far as they solve not only the challenge of pantheism, but 
also the question of the world-creation. God is not a neutral entity, 
but a personal God who speaks, who reveals Himself in His word. 
This spontaneity of God is, of course, different from the mechanic 
necessity of the Heideggerian Deus artifex. The onto-theology of 
the present-at-hand, of things that just lie down in front of us, must 
thus be contrasted with the metaphysics of verbum in which the 
human mind and the things themselves are vivifi ed by the power of 
the word.
Let us start with the human spirit. The divine word empow-
ers the human spirit, endows it with the creative force of language. 
The similarity between man and God is therefore a similarity of the 
Word. This is, according to Gadamer, the beginning of the entire 
essence of modernity11. Language is not just a collection of words, 
but a dynamic force in which perspectives separate or confl ate. In 
this context Gadamer makes an analogy with the Cusanian idea of 
perspective in painting: 
The thought of point of view, of fi nite, fl uctuant interchangea-
ble point of view, gives an entirely new meaning to the thought 
of the individual-singular. The individual becomes the comple-
mentary concept to the universal. A given view, the image of-
fered by things, in fact always depends just upon its respective 
point of view, and is to that extent not the whole and the true. 
Yet at the same time all points of view imply all views, and thus 
it is the one universal, the true being of which is not simply 
presented in them, but instead consists in them12.
11. See also M. J. SOTO-BRUNA, La recomposición del espejo. Análisis histórico-fi losófi co de 
la idea de expresión (Eunsa, Pamplona, 1995) 166-195; P. CASARELLA, Selbstgestal-
tung des Menschen nach Nikolaus von Kues und modernes Verständnis des Menschen: 
aufgezeigt an Hans-Georg Gadamer, in K. KRÄMER (ed.), Die Sermones des Nikolaus 
von Kues. Inhaltliche Schwerpunkte, Series Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der 
Cusanus-Gesellschaft, vol. 31 (Paulinus, Trier, 2006) 29-52; P.M. WATTS, Nicolaus 
Cusanus: A Fifteenth Century Vision of Man (Brill, Leiden, 1982).
12. H.G. GADAMER, Nicolaus Cusanus cit., 76. See also M. E. MOORE, Nicholas of 
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Cusanus refers to a painting of Rogier van der Weyden that helps 
Gadamer make his point. The peculiarity of this painting lies in 
the gaze of the pictured fi gure, who seems to look at the viewer no 
matter what his position is. The perspectivism of the position of the 
viewer (which can change spatially in many ways) encounters the 
continuity of the gaze, which allows the viewer a direct confronta-
tion with the being of the painting itself. In this experience, the 
viewer encounters the painting but also himself. Gadamer speaks 
about an encounter of the spirit with itself but underlines that it 
is not a matter of subjectivism or relativism, but rather a spiritual 
experience in which the human spirit becomes aware of what it is 
precisely through the encounter with the divine:
...here the subject, the I, is adapted to the structural relation of 
the relative, and his ascent above the relative, his vis creativa, 
which allows him to construct his image of the world on the 
basis of his spirit, does not make him a God, but instead leads 
him to understand himself in terms of the divine incarnation in 
Jesus Christ. Cusanian anthropology is Christology13.
The fi gure that looks at the viewer recalls the idea of a divine seeing 
which is actively orientated towards creatures14. The artistic per-
spectivism is but an analogon to the linguistic perspectivism, which 
is manifested not only in the diversity of national languages, but also 
in the inner diversity that inhabits each language. Each language 
is indeed shaped by a pluralism of meaning: there are words that 
have more different meanings, like the French “bois,” which means 
Cusa and the Kairos of Modernity: Cassirer, Gadamer, Blumenberg (Punktum Books, 
Brooklyn, 2013) 64.
13. H.G.GADAMER, Nicolaus Cusanus cit., 76. On Cusanus’ Christology see R. MA-
JERAN, Christology as the Keystone of Cusanus’ Vision: Book Three of the De Docta 
Ignorantia, in A. KIJEWSKA & R. MAJERAN (eds.), Eriugena-Cusanus (Lublin, 2011) 
277-289.
14. On the divine seeing: M. J. SOTO-BRUNA, Die Schöpfung des Endlichen als “Sehen 
Gottes”: Cusanus (De visione Dei) und Johannes Scotus Eriugena, in A. KIJEWSKA, 
R. MAJERAN (eds.), Eriugena-Cusanus cit., 149-170; A. KIJEWSKA, Etymology and 
Philosophy: God as ‘videns et currens’, in A. KIJEWSKA, R. MAJERAN (eds.), Eriugena-
Cusanus cit., 117-134.
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both wood and forest. This pluralism does not, however, cut off the 
relation between words and references, in the same way in which 
the gaze of the pictured fi gure is not undermined by the positional 
change of the viewer.
Gadamer builds upon this theological and metaphysical val-
orization of language in the last part of his masterpiece Truth and 
Method. Cusanus’ philosophy is inspiring and useful particularly on 
a matter of strategic importance for hermeneutics: the concept for-
mation (Begriffsbildung). The linguistic concept formation proves 
that language is not just a tool of thinking, as the Greeks and the 
Moderns have believed. On the contrary, language and thinking 
are organically bound, and language is crucial for the creativity of 
the human spirit. Here Gadamer introduces the Cusanian concept 
‘vocabulum naturale’ meant to indicate precisely the spontaneity of 
language within thinking. This is the last step that Gadamer takes 
at the end of Truth and Method in order to articulate an ontology of 
language. It follows a previous discussion of the concept of mental 
language (verbum mentis, verbum interius) in Augustine and Aquinas; 
in this way, Gadamer establishes a continuity between the Augus-
tinian-Thomistic verbum interius and the Cusanian vocabulum natu-
rale. Such continuity is generally overseen, with few exceptions15, 
in the scholarship on the medieval tradition of inner language. It is 
Gadamer’s merit to bring into full light the force of this tradition in 
the passage from Medieval to Renaissance philosophy. I have previ-
ously analyzed in detail Gadamer’s reading of the “mental language” 
from Augustine to Cusanus16. I will focus here on the relevance of 
this concept for the metaphysical question of the similarity between 
divine and human mind.
The “inner word” is employed by Augustine and Aquinas in 
order to give an intelligible account of the Trinity17. There is an 
15. J. HENNIGFELD, Verbum-Signum. La défi nition du langage chez St. Augustin et Nico-
las de Cues, “Archives de Philosophie” 54 (1991) 255-268. 
16. M. OLIVA, Das innere Verbum in Gadamers Hermeneutik (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 
2009).
17. See the reference work of Claude Panaccio on the history of inner language: 
C. PANACCIO, Le discours intérieur. De Platon à Guillaume d’Ockham (Seuil, Paris, 
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analogy between the human word and the second person of the 
Trinity, the Son. The outspoken human word (verbum prolatum) 
originates from an inner word in the same way in which the in-
carnate Jesus is conductible to the second person of the Trinity; 
additionally, the human inner word proceeds from thinking in the 
same way in which God the Son proceeds within the Trinity. The 
inner and the outspoken word are not two different words, but 
two aspects of language, in the same way in which Jesus and the 
second person of the Trinity are one and the same person. While 
the human outspoken word always takes the form of a particular 
language (English, Spanish, Russian), the inner word is independ-
ent from any national language. It is a process within the human 
thought that makes possible the manifestation outwards, in a na-
tional language. 
Augustine spells out this process through the dynamic triads 
memoria-intellegentia-voluntas and mens-notitia-amor whose individ-
ual terms correspond to the three persons of the Trinity (memoria/
mens to the Father, intellegentia/notitia to the Son, voluntas/amor to 
the Holy Spirit). The dynamic relation of the three members of 
the triads ensues as an inner word, an inner language. The verbum 
cordis constitutes therefore the inner dynamism of the Trinity as cum 
amore notitia:
This word is conceived in love, whether it be the word of the 
creature or the word of the Creator, that is, of a changeable 
nature or of the unchangeable truth. (...) But the word is born 
when that which is thought pleases us, either for the purpose 
of committing sin or of acting rightly. Love, therefore, as a 
means, joins our word with the mind from which it is born; and 
as a third it binds itself with them in an incorporeal embrace, 
without any confusion18.
1999). See also G. KLIMA (ed.), Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation 
in Medieval Philosophy (Fordham University Press, New York, 2014).
18. AUGUSTINE, On the Trinity. Books 8-15, Book IX, 8.13, ed. G.B. Matthews, transl. 
S. McKenna (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) 34-35.
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At the human level, such inner language is prior to any national, 
particular language — the verbum prolatum. It represents the inner 
dynamism of language itself, not a primary language ‘before lan-
guage’. The distinction between an inner and outer language does 
not introduce therefore a second language. It rather captures the 
dynamism of language under two aspects: the inner and the outer. 
Gadamer’s interest for the doctrine of mental language targets 
mainly this dynamic character of language. Contrary to some con-
temporary analytic theories of mental language (such as Jerry Fo-
dor’s language of thought), he puts less emphasis on the composi-
tional structure of language, preferring to focus on the emergence 
of language from thought. His preference might be read as a meta-
physical option: the question of the emergence of language is indeed 
a foundational question, that ultimately refl ects the wonder about 
language: Why do we speak? Such option distinguishes the herme-
neutics of the inner language from other mental language theories, 
particularly from compositionalism (that considers mental language 
as structure of thought) or representationalism (that considers the 
mental language as conceptual representation)19. 
It should be noted though that this dynamism remains bound 
to the linguistic reference, for language does not express the spirit 
but the intended object. Language represents the creativity of the 
human spirit as image of God; such creativity operates in relation 
to the world to which we belong and not in separation from it. The 
connection between the inner dynamism of language and the lin-
guistically expressed object is preserved in Aquinas20, who brings 
the concept of inner word to a full technical description. Aquinas 
evolves from the analysis of the relation between verbum mentis and 
species intelligibilis in Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum to a more 
19. Stephan Meier-Oeser distinguishes between pictorialist and propositionalist the-
ories of mental language. See S. MEIER-OESER, Sprache und Bilder im Geist. Skiz-
zen zu einem philosophischen Langzeitprojekt, “Philosophisches Jahrbuch” (Alber, 
Freiburg/München, 2004) 313. 
20. Y. FLOUCAT, L’intime fécondité de l’intelligence. Le verbe mental selon Saint Thomas 
d’Aquin (Téqui, Paris, 2001) 111; R. PASNAU, Theories of Cognition in the Later 
Middle Ages (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997) 254-271.
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elaborated description of the emergence of the inner word in the 
later works (Summa contra gentiles, Summa theologiae etc). Although 
it is a mediator between thought and known object, the inner word 
is not a third term, but a process that abides in the speaker under the 
infl uence of love: “Hence, love also in ourselves is something that 
abides in the lover, and the word of the heart is something abiding 
in the speaker; yet with a relation to the thing expressed by word, 
or loved”21. Aquinas describes the emergence of the inner word as a 
peculiar act: an act from an act (ut actus ex actu):
In like manner, too, the word conceived by our intellect does 
not proceed from potency to act except in so far as the intel-
lect proceeds from potency to act. For all that, the word does 
not arise in our intellect except as it exists in act; rather, simul-
taneously with its existence in act, there is a word conceived 
therein22.
The mental language is not a potency actualized after the act of 
thinking, but a process simultaneous with thinking. On the other 
hand, the word can be understood also as the result, the product 
of the intellective act. Such ambivalence, Gadamer believes, is well 
captured by Aquinas’ use of the Neo-platonic concept of emanation 
in the description of the emergence of the inner word. Emanation 
is a peculiar type of process, in which what is emanated is identical 
with the process of emanation, the same way in which the water in 
a fountain is identical with the fl ow that moves the water up and 
down. Thus, the word is not the end-result of the act of knowledge, 
but is simultaneous with the formation of the intellect23. In analogy 
with the inner-Trinitarian processions, the inner word designates 
therefore the procession of language from thought. 
21. T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, I, q. 37, a.1, transl. Fathers of the English Do-
minican Province (Ave Maria Press, Notre Dame, 1981) 189.
22. T. AQUINAS, Summa contra gentiles, book 4, transl. C. J. O’Neill (Notre Dame 
University Press, Notre Dame, 1975) 98.
23. H.-G. GADAMER, Truth and Method, transl. J. Weinsheimer (Continuum, Lon-
don, 2007) 424.
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Cusanus’ concept of vocabulum naturale is quite similar to Au-
gustine’s and Aquinas’ inner word. The natural name is united with 
the form of the thing and occurs by the operation of reason:
Nevertheless, the imposition of the name is made at will, since 
another name could have been imposed. Thus, although [the 
imposition is made] at will, nonetheless [the imposed name] is 
not other than, and not wholly different from, the natural name 
that is united to the form. Rather, after the advent of the form 
the natural name shines forth in all the various names imposed 
variously by all the different nations. Therefore the imposition 
of a name occurs by the operation of reason24.
The vocabulum naturale takes the concept formation out of the clas-
sical logic of essence. The concept formation occurs not through 
a mere abstraction, but as a crucial element of what Gadamer calls 
a logic of experience, which can include even the supernatural ex-
perience. The logic of experience represents the concrete life of 
language which includes its history of meaning, its grammar, and its 
syntax. The primary natural way of concept formation is indeed en-
capsulated into the variations and games of meaning that take place 
in every lively language, following the various aspects of things, to-
gether with men’s interests and needs. The scientifi c concept forma-
tion is only an abstract derivate from this linguistic process embed-
ded in man’s concrete life. Gadamer borrows here an example from 
Ernst Cassirer: there is an African language which has two hundred 
different words for camel, according to the camel’s particular cir-
cumstances and relationships to the desert dwellers. The specifi c 
meanings that the reference “camel” receives in these linguistic oc-
currences make it seem to be an entirely different creature.
At the same time, it would be wrong to see language as purely 
accidental, for all denominations still refer to the same object. Gad-
amer underlines that it is the merit of Cusanus to fi nd a mediation 
between the essential order of things and the linguistic variations 
24. CUSANUS, Idiota de mente, in Complete Philosophical cit., vol. 1, 539.
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through the concepts of vocabulum naturale and complicatio/explica-
tio. His reconstruction of Cusanus’ contribution to the tradition of 
mental language associates therefore the linguistic issue of vocabu-
lum naturale to the metaphysical and theological conceptual pair 
complicatio/explicatio. At the human linguistic level, all languages are 
explications of the unity of the mind whose dynamism is constituted 
by the vocabulum naturale: 
Accordingly, the multiplicity in which the human mind un-
folds itself is not a mere fall from true unity and not a loss of 
its home. Rather, there has to be a positive justifi cation for 
the fi nitude of the human mind, however much this fi nitude 
remains related to the infi nite unity of the absolute being. This 
is prepared for in the idea of complicatio, and from this point of 
view the phenomenon of language also acquires a new aspect. 
It is the human mind that both complicates and explicates. The 
unfolding into discursive multiplicity is not only conceptual, 
but also extends into the verbal sphere. It is the variety of pos-
sible appellations — according to the various languages — that 
potentiates conceptual differentiation25. 
Gadamer’s use of the complicatio/explicatio pair in defending Cusa-
nus as belonging to the tradition of the mental language is con-
sistent with his preference for an account of the mental language 
in terms of intellectual act, generation or emergence26. Cusanus’ 
vocabulum naturale enriches the tradition of the mental language 
through a grasp of the relation between the inner dynamism of the 
spirit and the pluralism of the outer language. While Augustine 
and Aquinas focus on the emergence of the inner word, Cusanus 
spells out also the relation between this emergence and the mul-
25. H.G. GADAMER, Truth cit., 435. See also H. G. GADAMER, Die Legitimität der 
Neuzeit, in H. G. GADAMER, Gesammelte Werke (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1999) 
vol. 4, 59.
26. The relation between the Cusanian complicatio/explicatio and the procession of the 
mental language described by Augustine and Aquinas would deserve, I believe, a 
further analysis. 
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tiplicity of the national, outspoken languages. The multiplicity of 
the outer language is rooted in the inwardness of the mind, in the 
same way in which explicatio is rooted in complicatio. The creativity 
of the human spirit as image of God is thus grounded in the internal 
dynamism of the mental language and manifested in the plurality of 
the external language. 
3. BEING AND WORD 
Finally, the focus of metaphysics on the divine verbum has a crucial 
impact on the concept of Being. In this sense, Being is not anymore 
understood only from the standpoint of a present-at-hand which 
is seen through perception or intellectual intuition, but also from 
the possibility of hearing the word. Gadamer believes that Cusanus 
has fully grasped the revolutionary character of the metaphysics of 
verbum: 
[H]e takes up a radical and critical position with regard to 
the central problem of scholasticism, the struggle carried out 
between the Platonists and Aristotelians, and even more so 
within Aristotelianism, concerning the manner of the being of 
the universal. He says that on the whole the ancients failed to 
understand properly the work of the Verbum, the word, and 
therefore also failed to understand the essence of creation. For 
the Verbum is the verbum creans; it is no mere adjunct to all 
forms of being and possibilities, as the ‘world-soul’ was for the 
ancients, but is instead the word created out of the will. In the 
end, the ancients were only able to think of the emergence of 
the world as the unfolding of a necessity — that is the limita-
tion that they were incapable of overcoming, however much 
they would have liked, since Anaxagoras, to emphasize the 
‘spirituality’ of the basis of the world27. 
27. H.G. GADAMER, Nicolaus Cusanus cit., 77. See also H.G. GADAMER, Philosophisches 
Lesebuch 1 (Frankfurt, 1965) 324.
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The medieval verbum is not a blind rational necessity, but a word 
animated by will. Augustine describes indeed the verbum as a pro-
cession within the triad memoria-intellegentia-voluntas, and, equiva-
lently, within the triad mens-notitia-amor. Voluntas and amor — cor-
responding to the Holy Spirit — indicate therefore an element of 
spiritual affection of the verbum that was lacking in the Greek meta-
physics of the logos. The question remains, however, if the shift to 
the inwardness of God as manifested in the verbum is really a step 
away from the insuffi ciency of Greek metaphysics. After all, this 
inwardness of God can hardly be approximated through our words 
and concepts: “Does Cusanus not save himself from the inadequacy 
of Greek metaphysics only by means of the fl ight into the incon-
ceivability of the divine will and of God’s activity?”28. In Truth and 
Method, Gadamer asks a similar question regarding Augustine’s and 
Aquinas’ theory of inner word:
One might well ask whether we are not here using the unintel-
ligible to explain the unintelligible. What sort of word is it that 
remains the inner dialogue of thought and fi nds no outer form 
in sound? Does such a thing exist?29.
The novelty brought by the focus on the verbum is certainly not easy 
to digest philosophically. What does it mean, indeed, that Being is 
word?
Gadamer directs the problem of Being to the problem of 
world-creation. He claims that the expression creatio ex nihilo is still 
indebted to Greek metaphysics and logic and does not fully cap-
ture the originality of Christianity: “That is why it is only a for-
mal description of the becoming of creation that is found in Greek 
negation, if one can name this a becoming out of nothingness”30. 
The radical novelty of Christianity is the understanding of Creation 
through the word of God:
28. H.G. GADAMER, Nicolaus Cusanus cit., 77.
29. H.G. GADAMER, Truth and Method cit., 421.
30. H.G. GADAMER, Nicolaus Cusanus cit., 78. 
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The ontological structure of creare, of the creational, is differ-
ent. It presents itself as the essence of the word. For this is the 
miracle of the word that, without making use of any beings, or 
transforming them, or casting them into new forms, it never-
theless makes present, calls into being31.
The understanding of creation through the Word of God that is 
present in the world has certainly a more dynamic and theopha-
nic sense than the fi gure of a fully detached producer. Gadamer 
refers here to Cusanus’ De possest, a text in which the lively action 
of the Word of God is frequently mentioned and in which Cusa-
nus also introduces the innovative concept possest. Cusanus quotes 
Psalm 147, 15: “The Lord sends a command to earth, his word runs 
swiftly!” The Word of God is that by which God creates the world, 
maintains it into existence and saves it:
This is the supreme teaching of Christ, our only savior: viz., 
that He Himself, who is the word of God, through which God 
created the world, provides all the things which nature lacks 
— provides them in him who with unwavering faith receives 
Christ as the Word of God, so that he, believing by faith in 
which Christ is present, can do all things by means of the 
Word dwelling in him through faith32.
The Word of God has a revelatory character:
Assuredly, Omnipotence itself — which God, the creator and 
the father of all things, is — is revealed in the commanding 
Word of the Almighty, who speaks and it is done. Nor can 
Omnipotence itself be revealed in anything other than its 
Word33. 
31. H.G. GADAMER, Nicolaus Cusanus cit., 78.
32. CUSANUS, De possest, in Complete Philosophical cit., vol. 2, 931.
33. CUSANUS, De possest cit., 932.
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The Word of God is a creative force which is not a simple disposi-
tion, but, as Gadamer argues, a constitution of Being. This consti-
tution of Being, in turn, should not be understood as something 
already present, as Vorhandenheit in Heidegger’s terms, nor as a col-
lection or reserve of beings, but rather as possest, the infi nite and un-
qualifi ed condition of all being. Gadamer reads the Cusanian possest 
in close relation to the metaphysics of the word:
Even the expression ‘creative’ has this meaning, which indeed 
does not simply mean to be disposed to create or to be compe-
tent in creating, but instead indicates a constitution of being, 
which for its part is not anything already present, is no re-
serve of extant beings, but is itself a being-able [Können], that 
is, being that is not — and of course is also not not. In any case, 
something is meant here that is expressed only incompletely 
by the concepts explicatio and complicatio, and Cusanus is aware 
of this. He does not love the traditional expression of the actus 
purus, in which all dynamis, all potentia, is drowned in pure es-
sence — he himself seeks the posse in being. To express this 
he ventures the bold word form possest, i.e., the total collapse 
into oneness of being-able and being, and at the summit of the 
meditation, as the summit of the meditation, being-able itself, 
the posse ipsum, appears to him ultimately as the infi nite and 
unqualifi ed condition of all being. To become cognizant of its 
own in all being is the great possibility of the human spirit. It 
is intelligentia. The internal reading of itself (intus legere) sees 
itself as being-able-to-be [Seinkönnen], but it likewise becomes 
aware in all being of that same persistence-in-being [Sich-in-
Sein-halten] that is being-able34. 
Gadamer’s appreciation of the role of the possest in the Cusanian 
metaphysics of verbum is undoubtedly infl uenced also by Hei-
degger’s critique of the idea of a divine producer that reduces Being 
to that which is feasible. In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 
34. H.G. GADAMER, Nicolaus Cusanus cit., 78.
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Heidegger claimed that the Thomistic concept of actualitas stems 
from the productive behavior of the Dasein, the human being, even 
though Aquinas was not, of course, aware of such an implicit gene-
alogy. Actus and actualitas belong to the semantic family of agere (to 
act) and contain the cultural energy of the Roman civilization which 
was focused on effi ciency and production35. Gadamer takes probably 
the Cusanian possest as a compromise down the road of the ontology 
of actus. Possest is indeed an invention that keeps together esse and 
posse, and opens the path to an understanding of the divine in its rich 
manifestation. It would of course be wrong to conclude from here 
that God is potency. In God, actuality and possibility coincide; only 
in the created are they separated. 
At the same time, it must be mentioned that Gadamer does 
rely heavily on the Thomistic notion of act in the analysis of ver-
bum mentis. As I have shown elsewhere36, this contradiction is only 
apparent. When Gadamer uses Aquinas’ actus in order to describe 
the generation of the verbum within the Trinity, the accent falls on 
the inner-Trinitarian dynamics. Possest expresses a different nuance, 
namely the relation between God’s interiority and creation. In Gad-
amer’s use of the Cusanian possest, the accent falls not on the proces-
sion of the inner word (described as actus), but rather on the issue of 
the concept formation. This issue, as I have shown above, refl ects 
the question of creation and of the relation between the divine unity 
and the multiplicity of the created. Thus the inner-Trinitarian pro-
cessuality is described as act, whereas God in His relation with the 
creation is approached as possest. 
35. M. HEIDEGGER, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, transl. A. Hofstadter (Indi-
ana University Press, Bloomington, 1988) 101-105. On Gadamer’s relation with 
Heidegger’s critique of Aquinas see M. OLIVA, Trinity and Difference: Gadamer and 
Heidegger on Aquinas, “Jahrbuch für Religionsphilosophie” 13 (2014).
36. M. OLIVA, Gadamer and Cusanus on Creation, “Philosophy Today” 2/55 (2011) 
184-191. The contrast between Aquinas’ actus and Cusanus’ possest is mitigat-
ed also by C. GIACON in Il «possest» del Cusano e le dottrine aristotelico-tomistiche 
dell’atto e potenza e dell’essenza ed esistenza, in Nicolò Cusano cit., 375-384.
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***
In conclusion, the medieval tradition of the verbum must be revisited 
in order to address the challenges of modern metaphysics, which 
Gadamer sums up in three major points: the problem of pantheism 
(i.e., the problem of God’s presence in the world), the question of 
subjectivity, and the question of Being. The metaphysics of ver-
bum articulated by Cusanus can open up an understanding of God’s 
spontaneity in creation, but also of God’s active presence in His 
own created world. Second, it claims the force of the human spirit as 
imago Dei; such force is not random and self-destructing, but rather 
follows the model of its own creator, the divine spirit. Third, it 
makes possible the understanding of Being in a mode different than 
the one of the presence-at-hand, which, as Heidegger has argued, is 
an ontological impoverishment. The concept of Being is wired with 
a theory of creation rooted in the divine dynamic interiority, which 
manifests itself in the emergence of the verbum.
